Mercer Law Review
Volume 69
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 20

12-2017

Workers' Compensation
H. Michael Bagley
J. Benson Ward

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bagley, H. Michael and Ward, J. Benson (2017) "Workers' Compensation," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 69 :
No. 1 , Article 20.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol69/iss1/20

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
and J. Benson Ward*
The 2016-2017 survey period was relatively quiet for workers'
compensation developments, but the workers' compensation system was
nonetheless impacted by appellate decisions during this period. Such
decisions involve issues ranging from statutes of limitations to willful
misconduct, including two decisions from the Georgia Supreme Court
reversing cases featured in last year's survey.'
I. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
There were no legislative changes of major significance during the
survey period.
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Roseburg Forest Products Co. v. Barnes,2 the Georgia Supreme
Court reversed the Georgia Court of Appeals' 2015 decision in Barnes v.
Roseburg ForestProducts Co. 3 on multiple statute of limitations issues.4
The case arose out of a 1993 accident that resulted in a below-the-knee
amputation of the claimant's left leg. The claimant was an employee of
Georgia-Pacific, which Georgia Conversion Primary Insurance Company
insured. Georgia Conversion accepted his claim as "catastrophic," and he
*Partner in the firm of Drew, Eck1 & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1977); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1980). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
-Partner in the firm of Drew, Eck1 & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.A., summa cum laude, 2002); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 2005). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of workers' compensation law during the prior survey period, see
H. Michael Bagley & J. Benson Ward, Workers' Compensation, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 68 MERCER L. REV. 333 (2016).
2. 299 Ga. 167, 787 S.E.2d 232 (2016).
3. 333 Ga. App. 273, 775 S.E.2d 748 (2015).
4. Roseburg, 299 Ga. at 168, 787 S.E.2d at 235.
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received temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. After being fitted with
a prosthetic leg, he returned to light-duty work at Georgia-Pacific in 1994
and, at that time, his TTD benefits were suspended.5
The claimant continued working at the plant after Georgia-Pacific sold
it to Roseburg Forest Products Company until he lost his job during a
force reduction in September 2009. He subsequently sought medical
treatment for his knee in November 2009 and, in December 2011, he was
fitted for a new prosthetic leg. That medical treatment was paid for by
the servicing agent for Georgia Conversion.6
In August 2012, the claimant requested a hearing under the 1993
accident date seeking recommencement of TTD benefits in his
catastrophic claim. In November 2012, the claimant filed a claim against
Roseburg Forest Products Company alleging a fictional new injury based
on his last date worked, September 11, 2009. The Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) held a hearing and denied both claims. The ALJ denied the
request to resume the TTD benefits under the 1993 catastrophic claim as
barred by the change of condition statute of limitation in
section 34-9-104(b)7 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A),
and denied the 2009 fictional new injury claim as barred under the oneyear statute of limitation contained in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82.8 The appellate
division of the State Board of Workers' Compensation (Board) affirmed,
as did the Dooly County Superior Court. 9
The court of appeals reversed on both issues. The court held that the
request for recommencement of TTD benefits in the 1993 catastrophic
claim was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-104(b). Further, the court held that the one-year statute of
limitations governing the 2009 fictional injury was tolled by the
December 2011 medical treatment.1 0
First, the supreme court addressed the application of the change of
condition statute of limitation to the 1993 claim pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-104(b), and held that the claimant's request for additional TTD
benefits was time-barred.11 The court held that the change of condition
statute of limitations applies equally to claims designated as catastrophic
as to non-catastrophic claims; a claimant has two years from the last

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 167, 787 S.E.2d at 234.
Id. at 167-68, 787 S.E.2d at 234.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82 (2017).
Roseburg, 299 Ga. at 168, 787 S.E.2d at 234-35.
Id.
Id. at 169-70, 787 S.E.2d at 235.
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payment of income benefits to file a request for additional TTD benefits. 12
The fact the injury was designated catastrophic did not create an
exception to the wording of the statute.1 3 While claimants with a
catastrophic injury such as Barnes have a right to receive weekly TTD
benefits until they experience a change in condition for the better, "OCGA
§ 34-9-104(b) makes clear that, in order for Barnes to enforce that right,
he must make a claim for those benefits within two years of the last
weekly TTD benefit payment made to him by his employer." 14 Because
the claimant waited longer than two years before filing a claim to enforce
his right to resume TTD benefits under the 1993 accident, the statute of
limitations barred his request.' 5
Further, the supreme court held that the 2009 fictional new injury was
similarly time-barred because the claimant did not file a WC-14 Notice
of Claim for the 2009 injury until November 2012, more than three years
after the date of the accident.16 The court determined that, under
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a),17 the claimant's November 13, 2009 medical
treatment would have extended the period for him to file his claim for a
year from that date.' 8 However, the claimant did not file his notice of
claim within that one-year period, and accordingly, his 2009 claim
became time-barred as of November 14, 2010, pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-82(a). 19 The court held that the claimant's medical treatment in
2011 could not revive his already time-barred claim. 20 In doing so, the
supreme court rejected the framework that the court of appeals holding
established-a framework in which an injured worker could revive a
stale claim at any time by obtaining further medical treatment-as such
a result "would essentially render the one-year statute of limitation of
OCGA § 34-9-82(a) meaningless." 21

12. Id. at 170, 787 S.E.2d at 235.
13. Id.
14.

Id.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 170-71, 787 S.E.2d at 236.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a) (2017).
Roseburg, 299 Ga. at 171, 787 S.E.2d at 236.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 171-72, 787 S.E.2d at 236.
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III. WILLFUL MISCONDUCT

Chandler Telecom, LLC v. Burdette22 similarly saw the Georgia
Supreme Court reverse the Georgia Court of Appeals. 23 The claimant in
Chandler Telecom was hired to work as a cell tower technician, worked
for three weeks, was fired while on a five-week leave of absence, and was
rehired almost immediately. On his first day back on the job, the
claimant was working on the top of a cell tower when-despite express
instructions from his supervisor and lead hand to climb down the cell
tower-he descended a cell tower by controlled descent, akin to
rappelling, instead of climbing down the tower. During his controlled
descent, the claimant fell a great distance and sustained injuries to his
ankle, leg, and hip. 24

The ALJ denied the claimant's request for workers' compensation
benefits, finding that O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17(a) 25 barred the claimant from
recovering workers' compensation benefits because he engaged in "willful
misconduct" when he defied his supervisor's instructions by using
controlled descent to climb down the tower. 26 The appellate division
affirmed and adopted the ALJ's findings, and the decision was affirmed
by operation of law on appeal to the Putnam County Superior Court. 27
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the claimant's actions
did not constitute willful misconduct under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17(a). 28
Citing a supreme court decision from almost a century ago, Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Carroll,29 the court of appeals ruled that the claimant's
actions and violation of his supervisor's orders were not behavior of a
"quasi criminal nature involving the intentional doing of something
either with the knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury, or
with a wanton and reckless disregard of its probable consequences." 30
Thus, though the claimant may have deliberately violated both a work
rule and his supervisor's express instructions, and instead engaged in
hazardous behavior, such action was not conduct of a quasi-criminal
nature, and denial of the claim was therefore improper.31

22. 300 Ga. 626, 797 S.E.2d 93 (2017).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 626, 797 S.E.2d at 95.
25. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17(a) (2017).
26. Chandler Telecom, 300 Ga. at 626, 797 S.E.2d at 95.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 169 Ga. 333, 150 S.E. 208 (1929).
30. Chandler Telecom, 300 Ga. at 628, 797 S.E.2d at 96 (quoting Burdette v. Chandler
Telecom, LLC, 335 Ga. App. 190, 195, 779 S.E.2d 75, 79 (2015)).
31. Id.
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The supreme court disagreed with the standard applied by the court
of appeals and reversed. 32 The court first determined the statutory
framework of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17,33 noting that the list of actions that
willful misconduct includes-such as intentional self-inflicted injuries,
injuries growing out of the employee's attempt to injure another person,
or injuries due to the employee's willful failure or refusal to use a safety
appliance, or perform a duty required by statute-is a non-exhaustive list
of acts constituting willful misconduct, and other acts not enumerated in
the text of the statute may also constitute willful misconduct. 34 As the
statute does not define the scope of willful misconduct, the decision in
Carroll confirmed that willful misconduct requires more than mere
negligence. 35 Further, it provided the requisite mental state of an
employee whose actions constituted willful misconduct is an intentional
and deliberate act performed either with knowledge that the act is likely
to result in serious injury, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the
probable consequences of the act. 36 The court further determined that a
1993 court of appeals decision, Wilbro v. Mossman, 37 which held that the
action must be criminal or quasi-criminal in nature to constitute willful
misconduct, misinterpreted Georgia law. 38
In explaining the court's reasoning on evaluating willful misconduct
under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17, the supreme court determined that an
employee's violation of an employer's instructions or performance of a
hazardous act, where the danger is obvious, does not alone rise to the
level of willful misconduct. 39 However, when the employee knowingly
violates an employer's rule and performs an obviously dangerous,
hazardous act, and the finder of fact further determines that the
employee's act was done either with the knowledge that it was likely to
result in serious injury, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of its
probable injurious consequences, then compensation will be barred. 40
The court noted that Wilbro was wrong to the extent the court held that
the intentional violation of employer rules can never constitute willful
misconduct, even when the violation involves knowingly doing a

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 631-32, 797 S.E.2d at 98.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17 (2017).
Chandler Telecom, 300 Ga. at 628-29, 797 S.E.2d at 96-97.
Id. at 629-30, 797 S.E.2d at 97.
Id.
207 Ga. App. 387, 427 S.E.2d 857 (1993).
Chandler Telecom, 300 Ga. at 630-31, 797 S.E.2d at 98-99.
Id.
Id. at 631, 797 S.E.2d at 98.
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hazardous act in which the danger is obvious.4 1 Similarly, it is not willful
misconduct whenever an employee intentionally violates an employer's
rule; rather, the standard is whether the act was done either with the
knowledge that it was likely to result in serious injury, or with the
wanton and reckless disregard of its probable consequences. 42
The supreme court remanded the case for the appellate division to
make findings of fact on the issue of whether the claimant intentionally
violated the employer's instructions either with the knowledge that the
controlled descent was likely to result in serious injury, or with a wanton
and reckless disregard of the probable consequences of his controlled
descent. 43
IV. AGGRAVATION AND CHANGE OF CONDITION

During this survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals again
evaluated a change of condition issue. In McDuffie v. Ocmulgee EMC,44
the court considered whether a claimant's aggravation injury resolved
such that he had undergone a change of condition for the better. 45
The claimant in McDuffie sustained a right-knee injury in 2009 while
working for Ocmulgee EMC as a meter reader and right-of-way laborer,
and Ocmulgee EMC accepted the claim as compensable and commenced
benefits. Ocmulgee EMC subsequently discovered that the claimant
provided false information on his job application in 2007 when he failed
to disclose both a prior injury and his sedentary work restrictions, and
instead affirmed that he was physically able to perform job duties
including standing, walking, and carrying parts. The claimant previously
injured his right knee in a 2002 accident with another employer, for
which he underwent three surgeries and was given permanent sedentary
work restrictions. After learning of this misrepresentation, Ocmulgee
EMC fired the claimant and suspended his TTD benefits. When the
authorized treating physician performed another surgery and took the
claimant out of work in 2011, Ocmulgee EMC recommenced indemnity
benefits. The authorized treating physician later released the claimant
to return to work with sedentary work restrictions, and opined that he
had returned to his pre-injury baseline. Because the authorized treating
physician determined that the claimant had returned to his pre-2009
sedentary work status, Ocmulgee EMC again suspended TTD benefits

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 632, 797 S.E.2d at 98.
338 Ga. App. 200, 789 S.E.2d 415 (2016).
Id. at 200, 789 S.E.2d at 417.
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based on this change of condition for the better and resolution of the
work-related aggravation. 46
The claimant requested a hearing seeking reinstatement of TTD
benefits, and the ALJ denied the request, finding that Ocmulgee EMC
had met its burden of proving a change in condition for the better. 47 The
appellate division affirmed, as did the Dodge County Superior Court.4 8
The court of appeals affirmed the finding of a physical change in
condition for the better, as evidence existed in the record to support such
a finding; namely, the opinions of the authorized treating physician and
a second doctor that the claimant returned to his pre-2009 baseline. 49
While the record contained conflicting medical opinions regarding
whether the claimant's current problems and work restrictions related to
his 2002 injury or his 2009 injury, the ALJ properly considered the
evidence and made factual findings that were supported by the
evidence.50 The court also determined that, in workers' compensation
cases, medical testimony need only be based on a reasonable probability,
and not reasonable certainty.5 1
However, the court of appeals also agreed with the claimant that
Ocmulgee EMC was required to show that suitable employment was
available before suspending his indemnity benefits, notwithstanding the
claimant's return to his pre-injury baseline status. 52 The court held that
the employer could not suspend the claimant's TTD benefits based on a
change in condition for the better without showing both that the claimant
could return to work because of that change in condition, and that the
employer offered the claimant suitable work. 53 Citing Sadie G. Mays
Memorial Nursing Home v. Freeman,54 the court of appeals stated that
the key determination was whether suitable work was available and
offered to the claimant to diminish or end his loss in income, and if no
such work was available, then the employer must continue paying
benefits.5 5 The court further emphasized that the Georgia Workers'

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 200-01, 789 S.E.2d at 417-18.
Id. at 200, 789 S.E.2d at 417.
Id.
Id. at 201, 789 S.E.2d at 418.
Id. at 201-02, 789 S.E.2d at 418.
Id. at 202-03, 189 S.E.2d at 418-19.
Id. at 203, 789 S.E.2d at 419.
Id.
163 Ga. App. 557, 559, 295 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1982).
McDuffie, 338 Ga. App. at 203, 789 S.E.2d at 419.
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Compensation Act56 is highly remedial in nature and must be construed
"liberally in favor of the claimant."57
Because the ALJ did not make findings of fact on the issues of whether
suitable work was available, and the claimant's entitlement to indemnity
benefits if no suitable work was offered, the court of appeals remanded
the case for further findings of fact.58 Of the panel of judges, only three
judges concurred with the opinion regarding the employer's obligation to
show the availability of light-duty work after a work-related aggravation
subsides under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4),59 and six of the judges concurred in
the judgment only.60 Accordingly, under Court of Appeals Rule 33(a), 61
this portion of the opinion may be physical precedent only. The Georgia
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and oral argument was heard
in June 2017.62
V. CONTINUous EMPLOYMENT

The Georgia Court of Appeals dealt with the issue of continuous
employment in Avrett Plumbing Co. v. Castillo,63 where the claimant was
injured over the weekend while staying in employer-provided housing.
The claimant was hired as an hourly employee by a plumbing company
based in Augusta to work Monday through Friday at an hourly rate of
pay. The claimant did not have an Augusta residence, and the employer
provided the claimant with a hotel room in Augusta during the work
week. The employer gratuitously allowed the claimant to use the
Augusta hotel room over the weekend-even though he did not work
weekends-because the employer paid for the hotel on a weekly basis,
and the room would have been otherwise left unused.64
On a Sunday afternoon while in Augusta, the claimant was on a
personal errand to buy groceries for himself when he tripped and broke
his ankle. There was no dispute that the claimant was off work and was
not on-call at the time of the injury. The claimant sought workers'
56. O.C.G.A. tit. 16, ch. 90 (2017).
57. McDuffie, 338 Ga. App. at 203, 789 S.E.2d at 419. ContraO.C.G.A. § 34-9-23 (2017)
(providing "This chapter shall be liberally construed only for the purpose of bringing
employers and employees within the provisions of this chapter and to provide protection for
both.. . . The provisions of this chapter shall be construed and applied impartially to both
employers and employees.").
58. McDuffie, 338 Ga. App. at 203-04, 789 S.E.2d at 419.
59. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (2017).
60. McDuffie, 338 Ga. App. at 204, 789 S.E.2d at 419.
61. GA. CT. APP. R. 33(a) (2017).
62. Ocmulgee EMC v. McDuffie, No. S17C0038, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 129 (Feb. 27, 2017).
63. 340 Ga. App. 671, 798 S.E.2d 268 (2017).
64. Id. at 672, 798 S.E.2d at 270.
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compensation benefits under the theory that he was a continuous
employee at the time of his injury.65 The ALJ found that the claimant
was not on-call on the weekend he was injured, but found that he was a
continuous employee because he was required by his employment to live
away from home while working. Thus, the judge granted the request for
benefits.6 6 The appellate division reversed and denied the claim, finding
that the claimant was neither on-call nor a continuous employee because
he remained in Augusta for personal reasons that were unrelated to his
employment, and he was not away from his residence for a work-related
purpose at the time he was injured.67 The Richmond County Superior
Court reversed the appellate division and reinstated the ALJ's award
after holding that the claimant was a continuous employee, his
employment required him to be in the general locale of the employer, and
he simply decided to remain in Augusta to prepare for work the following
day. 68
The court of appeals first addressed the standard of review on appeal
by the superior court, noting that the superior court must accept the
appellate division's findings of fact if there is any evidence in the record
to support them.69 Because some evidence existed that supported the
appellate division's finding that the claimant was not present in Augusta
on the Sunday of the accident for an employment-related reason, the
superior court could not substitute its own factual findings for that of the
appellate division. 70
The court of appeals then held that the claim was not compensable,
because the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the
employment, as the claimant was not a continuous employee.7 1 Because
the appellate division found that the claimant was not required to be in
Augusta on Sunday for any employment-related reason, was not required
to lodge or work within an area geographically close to the employer's job
site during the weekends, and was in Augusta simply as a personal
convenience taking advantage of housing gratuitously provided by the
employer in order to be present at work the following day, he was not a
continuous employee on the weekend in question. 72 Accordingly, he was

65. Id. at 672-73, 798 S.E.2d at 270-71.
66. Id. at 673, 798 S.E.2d at 271.

67. Id.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 674, 798 S.E.2d at 271-72.
Id. at 674-75, 798 S.E.2d at 272.
Id.
Id. at 675, 798 S.E.2d at 272-73.
Id.
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not entitled to workers' compensation benefits, and the superior court's
judgment was reversed. 73
VI. EMPLOYERS SUBJECT TO THE ACT AND STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT

In Wills v. Clay County,74 the Georgia Court of Appeals determined
whether a contractor who occasionally employed three or more employees
constituted an employer under the Act. The employer submitted a bid on
a construction project to Clay County, which the county accepted. The
contract presented by the county to the employer included a provision
requiring the employer to provide workers' compensation insurance for
his workers. The employer told the county that he was not subject to the
Act, and the county removed that provision from the contract. The
employer then hired the claimant, who had performed work for the
employer occasionally over the past six to seven years, and two other men
to work on the construction project. While working on the project, the
claimant fell from a roof and injured his leg. He filed a workers'
compensation claim against both the employer and Clay County, arguing
that the county was a statutory employer because his direct employer did
75
not have workers' compensation insurance.
The ALJ found a compensable claim against the employer, finding him
liable for payment of workers' compensation benefits, but denied the
claim against the county, finding that the county was not a statutory
employer. 76 Both the claimant and the employer appealed, and the
77
appellate division affirmed, as did the Clay County Superior Court.
On appeal, the employer argued that he was not subject to the Act
because he did not have at least three employees regularly in service.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2(a)(2) 7 8 provides that the Act "shall not apply to ... any
person, firm, or private corporation, including any public-service
corporation, that has regularly in service less than three employees in
the same business within this state," and the employer claimed that,
though he had three additional workers for this specific job, none of those
individuals were regularly in his service. 79 In evaluating this issue, the
court noted that the standard for employees "regularly in service" is not
"constantly" or "continuously" in service, but instead, whether there is an
established mode or plan in the operation of the business, and that the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 675, 798 S.E.2d at 273.
339 Ga. App. 79, 793 S.E.2d 432 (2016).
Id. at 79-80, 793 S.E.2d at 434.
Id. at 80, 793 S.E.2d at 434.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2(a)(2) (2017).
Wills, 339 Ga. App. at 80, 793 S.E.2d at 434.
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work may be intermittent and yet regular.80 Because the employer
worked with the claimant two to three times per year, and had other jobs
at the time of this accident in which he hired several employees, there
was evidence to support the appellate division's affirmation of the ALJ's
finding that the employer here employed three employees regularly and
was thus subject to the Act. 8 ' An employer is subject to the Act if the
volume of the business increases such that an employer needs to hire
more people, and the employees would likely be working for a reasonably
definite amount of time while performing constant and steady work. 82
Evidence supported the appellate division's finding that the employer
employed three employees regularly because the employer was in the
practice of hiring additional employees when a construction project
required it, and was therefore subject to the Act. 8 3
The court also affirmed the finding that the county, under O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-8,84 was not a statutory employer.85 Applying the Georgia Supreme
Court's decision in Yoho v. Ringier of America, Inc., 86 the court explained
that an owner who undertakes to execute work or complete a project on
his property is not subject to the Act unless that owner also serves as a
contractor for another entity and hires another contractor to perform the
work on the premises. 8 7 Here, Clay County owned the property where the
work was performed and the accident occurred, but the county did not
have control over the employer's construction project or the management
of his employees. Instead, it contracted with the employer and then
stepped back and allowed the employer to execute the contract. Because
the county was simply the owner of the property, it was not a statutory
employer.88
Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the appellate division's finding
that the employer willfully failed to obtain workers' compensation
coverage, its award of attorney's fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-126,89
and penalty assessment.9 0 O.C.G.A. § 34-9-12191 requires Georgia
employers under the Act to procure workers' compensation insurance
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 80-81, 793 S.E.2d at 434-35.
Id. at 81, 793 S.E.2d at 435.
Id. at 81, 793 S.E.2d at 434-35.
Id. at 81, 793 S.E.2d at 435.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 (2017).
Wills, 339 Ga. App. at 82, 793 S.E.2d at 435.
263 Ga. 338, 434 S.E.2d 57 (1993).
Wills, 339 Ga. App. at 82, 793 S.E.2d at 435.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-126 (2017).
Wills, 339 Ga. App. at 82-83, 793 S.E.2d at 435--36.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-121 (2017).
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coverage or demonstrate ability to self-insure, and O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-126(b) 92 provides for a mandatory award of attorney's fees for an
employer's failure to obtain coverage 93. While the employer argued that
his lack of insurance coverage was not willful, evidence existed to support
the appellate division's findings that he was an employer under the Act
and therefore required to obtain coverage, and he knew he would need
three workers besides himself to complete the job but told the county he
was not required to obtain coverage. 94 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
assessment of penalties and attorney's fees.95
VII. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
In Saxon v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Co.,96 the injured worker was
employed as an ice cream delivery driver, and was injured while riding
as a delivery helper when his coworker rear-ended a vehicle. The
employer had three or more employees and was subject to the Act, but
had not obtained workers' compensation insurance coverage. The injured
worker filed a complaint in tort against his coworker and his employer,
and the employer's liability insurance carrier filed a petition for
declaratory judgment in which the automobile carriers intervened. All
three carriers moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the Act
provided the worker's exclusive remedy, and the Bryan County Superior
Court granted summary judgment.97
On appeal, the injured worker argued that application of the exclusive
remedy provision, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11,98 would leave him without a
remedy and thereby run counter to public policy, as he would be unfairly
punished due to the employer's failure to procure workers' compensation
insurance. The court of appeals noted the well-established law upholding
employers' statutory immunity from suit by injured employees to recover
damages other than workers' compensation benefits, regardless of
whether an employer had actually paid the workers' compensation
benefits. 99 Where an employer fails to procure workers' compensation
insurance, that employer remains liable for payment of workers'

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

O.C.G.A. § 24-9-126(b) (2017).
Wills, 339 Ga. App. at 82, 793 S.E.2d at 435.
Id. at 83, 793 S.E.2d at 436.
Id.
339 Ga. App. 495, 793 S.E.2d 659 (2016).
Id. at 495-97, 793 S.E.2d at 660-61.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (2017).
Saxon, 339 Ga. App. at 497-98, 793 S.E.2d at 661-62.
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compensation benefits, and thus, the injured worker is not left without a
remedy. 100 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. 101
VIII. APPEALS

FROM FINAL JUDGMENTS

The claimant in PremierElevator Co. ISOI v. Edwards 102 sustained an
injury to his left middle finger for which the employer-insurer provided
medical treatment, having accepted the claim on a "medical-only basis."
The claimant sought additional medical treatment, which the employerinsurer denied. The employer-insurer then filed a motion to dismiss the
claim for medical benefits, on grounds that it was barred by the one-year
statute of limitations contained in O.C.G.A. § 3-9-82.103 The ALJ denied
the employer-insurer's motion to dismiss, finding that the claim was not
barred by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82's statute of limitations. The appellate
division and the Henry County Superior Court affirmed, and the court of
appeals granted the employer-insurer's application for discretionary
appeal.104

The court of appeals noted that the ALJ, in its ruling denying the
motion to dismiss, found that the claimant had sustained a compensable
injury, but did not issue a compensation award, and accordingly, the
claim for benefits remained pending before the Board.105 O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-105(b)10e governs appeals from final awards, orders, judgments, or
decisions of the appellate division to the superior court. The court
observed that a plain reading of the statute only allows appeals from final
decisions. 107 Because the appellate division's affirmance of the AJ's
ruling did not constitute a final order or judgment as contemplated by
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b), the superior court was without jurisdiction to
consider the appeal. 108 Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the
judgment of the superior court and directed that the appeal be dismissed
as premature.10 9

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 498, 793 S.E.2d at 662.
Id. at 500, 793 S.E.2d at 663.
341 Ga. App. 235, 799 S.E.2d 588 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82 (2017).
PremierElevator, 341 Ga. App. at 235, 799 S.E.2d at 588.
Id. at 236, 799 S.E.2d at 588.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) (2017).
PremierElevator, 341 Ga. App. at 236, 799 S.E.2d at 588.
Id. at 236, 799 S.E.2d at 588-89.
Id.
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